Introduction
"We Arabs know American foreign policy is biased toward the Israelis," Anti-American resentment on the part of Arabs is not a new phenomenon.
Christian Science Monitor writer Cameron Barr remarks, "The roots of this anger lie in US political manipulations in the region during the 1950s and 1960s…As the world's only superpower, the US is bound to make some people unhappy at least some of the time." 6 William Quandt, a Middle East expert and a former staff member on the National Security Council, notes that a portion of Arab resentment towards the US derives from America's dominant role in the world. "On the one hand, everyone is awed by US power, but on the other, they distrust it...There is a certain inevitability that Middle
Easterners will view the United States with suspicion simply because it is the most powerful country in the world -quite apart from its policies." by extremists who are certainly not representative of Arabs as a whole, some of the very same issues--to be covered in this paper--that motivated the extremists also anger Arab governments and peoples in the Middle East.
Examples of recurring themes that irritate Arabs are the US military presence in the Arabian Gulf and America's perceived ambiguous stand on promoting democracy in the Middle East. In a part of the world where history is seldom forgotten, secular and religious Arabs alike draw parallels between the US presence and influence in the region today and that of European crusaders centuries ago. 10 In the spring of 2001, a Saudi
Arabian Ambassador assigned to a European country pointedly asked, "When will the United States ends its arrogance and withdraw from the Gulf?" 11 While the details are sketchy and officials on both the Saudi and US sides have intentionally played down the apparent rift between the countries, since the fall of 2001, it appears that the Saudi royal family and government (generally one and the same) are growing increasingly wary of the US military presence in the Kingdom. 12 The US presence inside a fiercely proud and independent country that bills itself as the keeper of the two holy Islamic cities of Mecca and Medina 13 draws unwanted notice and criticism to the Islamic Saudi government from both non-religiously and religiously motivated societal elements. This opposition has on more than one occasion already waged violent demonstrations against the US and the . Throughout this paper, because the topics are often considered rather politically sensitive, the author does not list the names of the Arab individuals interviewed. Without anonymity, Arab sources might be hesitant to discuss such subjects with a diplomat or with an American military officer, despite the fact that the topics are unclassified. This stems in part from the sources' concern over portraying their own Arab people in a negative light (this relates, in part, to Arab culture) and for fear of their own governments possibly enacting retribution against them. 3 This paper is based mostly upon comments and writings from educated, elite Arabs. By "elite" the author means Arabs generally at the top of Arab society, which is a minority. (There is not a large middle class in Arab countries.) Most Arab elites interviewed for this paper have connections or at least inroads into Arab governments. Arab sources are typically government officials, wealthy private citizens--businessmen or other professionals, and journalists. Many are Western educated, and most have either traveled extensively or lived in the West or in the United States. From his discussion with Arabs, professional readings, and personal experiences in the Middle East, the author contends that the sources' views are representative of dominant opinions in the Arab world. When it comes to the emotional issues discussed in this essay--Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict, the author believes the so-called "Arab street," or bulk of Arab citizens, feel very much the same as those in their society who are wealthier or more educated. In fact, because the "Arab street" is less exposed to outside (and various) views, and more subject to government propaganda in places like Syria, the author believes that the general populace feels even more strongly than Arab elites that American policies are biased and unjust. For instance, in the spring of 2000, a poor Syrian policeman (and most are poor) spoke with the author in a street in Damascus. The policeman told the author that he did not like Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and US foreign policy; this was in the wake of the failure of the Arab peace process. The policeman, who was likely exposed mostly to Syria's government-controlled media, could not explain why he did not like US policies, only that he despised them.
4 Shibley, Telhami, "It's Not About Faith: A Battle for the Soul of the Middle East," Current History 100, no. 650 (December 2001): 417.
5 For purposes of this paper, the "Arab World" stretches from across North Africa, from Morocco to Egypt, through the Levantine states of Jordan, Syria, Israel/Palestine, into the Arabian Peninsula -including the Arabian Gulf countries, and into Iraq. This paper does not include opinion from peoples in Turkey, Iran, South Asia, or Central Asia, although many individuals and states there, in many cases, would likely have similar thoughts. The paper is not concerned with Islamic opinion, per say, although the majority of people in the Arab world are Muslims. Considering Islamic versus Arab opinion toward American foreign policy opens up a separate (although sometimes common) set of concerns based on religion, or interpretation of religion. Instead, this paper seeks to explain complaints common to Arabs of various religions and ethnic subgroups across the Arab world. -approximately a half-mile--from the actual embassy compound. More ominous was the forceful entry and destruction of US government and personal property at the residence of US Ambassador Ryan Crocker, which is located about a half-mile from the actual embassy complex. While it can be argued that rapidly quelling the riots was beyond the capability of the Syrian security services, American diplomats in Damascus felt that the Syrian government was delivering an indirect message to the American government by allowing them to even occur. 20 Very few public events, particularly protests, are truly spontaneous in a country known for its pervasive security environment. Adding more credibility to the theory that the Syrian government turned a blind eye in the early stages of the attack is the fact that the American embassy is located in the same neighborhood that is heavily patrolled by plainclothes Syrian presidential security guards.
21
It is probably no coincidence the violence took place at the same time that the Syrian government was beginning to restore formal economic relations with Baghdad. 19 Arab governments, in general, maintain rather tight control over their societies. "Spur-of-the-moment" protests in Arab states are sometimes allowed by Arab governments as a means to let common citizens vent their anger. Protests are, in effect, a pressure valve meant to dissipate anger toward outside influences and to prevent Arab citizens from turning their frustrations toward their own governments. 20 Interviews with various US diplomats at US Embassy Syria, Damascus, Syria, June 1999. 21 The American Embassy in Damascus is located in the upscale Malki/Abu Romani district of Damascus. The Syrian Presidential offices and apartment are located approximately a half-mile away from the embassy. 22 Bouzid, 14.
Chapter 3
The Arab-Israeli Crisis -The Seminal Issue "Regarding America's foreign policy toward the Arabs, we don't actually expect the US to be one hundred percent unbiased, but we do wish the US was just ten percent However, as the 1967 "border" was never formally demarcated, the precise location of that line is difficult to ascertain. It was merely a line which Syrian tanks guarded before Israel launched pre-emptive attacks against the Arabs in the 1967 ArabIsraeli War. In the Syrian mind, though, that border touched Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee) on the northern part of the lake and then ran through the middle of the lake, or at a minimum touched the lake on the east of the body of water. At Geneva, Barak, through Clinton, proposed that the Israelis control not only all of Lake Tiberias' waters, but also maintain a small strip of land on the eastern portion of the lake. Therefore, the Syrians would lose complete control over the shoreline and any right to water. n.p., on-line, Internet, available from http://www.mafhoum.com/press/sealeh2.html. The popular story circulating around Damascus at the time of the Clinton-Asad meeting, and directly thereafter, was that Asad had swam in Lake Tiberias and barbecued on its shore as a child. Asad, however, grew up in a village in the mountains of Syria, far from Lake Tiberias. It is more likely that he never visited the lake as a child. The line of reasoning went that since Syrians had access to the lake at one time, they must again--as a result of the peace process--have access to the lake and its eastern shore.
14 Interviews, Damascus, Syria, 2000. 15 E-mail from Syrian cited in footnote number eight above. Neither the elites nor rank-and-file in any of these countries is oblivious to the implications for domestic and regional stability that flow from the prevailing perception that the United States is anything but 'even-handed' or 'honest,' or an 'honest broker,'
when it comes to the question of Palestine." While it is debatable if this amount will make a significant difference, the message sent to the Middle East and other developing countries is important.
Beyond trying to negotiate a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, American diplomatic efforts must also be expanded and improved at the informal person-to-person level. The State Department is grossly under-funded when it comes to entertainment funds and budgets. Because reimbursable representational funds are extremely tight for mid-level diplomats sent abroad--perhaps a US State Department diplomat can afford to host a few dinners or two decent functions in his home each year--American diplomats do not have the chance to properly mix in highly social Middle Eastern societies. While opportunities are limitless to spend time with Arabs since they genuinely gregarious and social people, the unwritten rule in upper class Arab society is that you must invite to be invited. In other words, if an American diplomat does not have proper funds to host dinners and functions, and also the inclination to spend extensive time with Arabs in a social setting, then that American will not be consistently invited by Arabs.
Real rapport between American diplomats and Arab foreign nationals, which will help dismantle distrust over time, is not built by official handshakes in front of television cameras. It is built by spending countless late nights together talking, eating Arabic food, and drinking coffee or tea. What might seem to Americans like idle talk and wasted time engaging in informalities builds genuine bridges between Arabs and Americans seeking to help Arabs better understand the constraints and nuances of US foreign policy.
Additionally, strong relationships built today between mid-level US diplomats and Arab officials in the Middle East will be the cornerstones of future American-Middle East relations.
Closely tied to diplomacy, and directly related to proactively shaping Arab perceptions of US foreign policy, is the informational instrument of power. American music, movies, and popular culture are popular with Arabs, but the United States has done a rather poor job of explaining and promoting our public position to the Arab world.
Since the end of the Cold War, government sponsored media programs, like the Voice of America radio network, have been drastically scaled back. Whether one labels such programs as propaganda, or calls them public awareness, there is currently no concerted or broad effort to explain to the Arabs American foreign policy in a media format that appeals to them.
In today's aggressive multi-media market, the US government needs to project a positive message on television, on the Internet, and on radio, detailing US goals and explaining US perspectives. America must end the somewhat arrogant line of reasoning that the world will "come to us," and we must now "go to them" if we hope to portray our policies in a more favorable light. While the Department of Defense might have been wise to shut down the controversial Office of Strategic Influence over allegations that it would spread misinformation, the US government--principally the State Department and Defense Department--desperately need an honest public relations campaign targeting Arab governments and particularly Arab people.
Perception matters as much as reality in terms of how American foreign policy is received around the globe, and perception is particularly critical now in the Arab world.
While the Arab-Israeli conflict rages on and as long as America contends that Saddam
Hussein must go, nothing short of America's credibility is at stake as the United States maneuvers to achieve its strategic objectives in the volatile Middle East.
